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I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the case of Eduin Rordriguez. Eduin was abandoned by
both parents at a young age in Honduras.1 He embarked on a dangerous
journey, moving from the tops of freight trains through Mexico, and
swimming through the Rio Grande to enter the United States at Hidalgo,
Texas.2 Under the language of § 1324(a)(2), the people who helped
Eduin cross the border into Texas knew that he did not have prior official
authorization to do so, and would be prosecuted under § 1324(a)(2) in
the Eleventh Circuit. If Eduin presented them with a fake visa, it is
unclear whether this would this exculpate them. The language of
§ 1324(a)(2) in its current state does not provide a predictable answer,
and depending on the jurisdiction in which this offense took place, the
answer may vary greatly.
Now consider the case of Miguel Perez and Juan Carlos Valdez—
two people who saw some people stranded in the water, and thought that
they were doing a good thing, they were just helping them out.3 The two
were in their boat, off the coast of Florida, when they spotted another
boat in the distance.4 The passengers in the other vessel seemed to be
having engine problems, and were signaling for help when they caught
Perez’s eye.5 When Perez and Valdez stopped, the passengers told them
that they were from Miami, had been fishing, and were having trouble
with their boat.6 When they agreed to bring the passengers to land, Perez
and Valdez asked all of them to see identification, except for one who

1

Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES,
August 25, 2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegalimmigrants-face-deportation.hmtl?pagewanted.
2
Id.
3
United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 776 (11th Cir. 2006).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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began to cry when they spoke with her.7 As Perez and Valdez docked
their boat in Miami-Dade County later that night, local police discovered
that the passengers were actually Cuban nationals illegally entering the
United States through Perez’ boat—unbeknownst to Perez.8 Both Perez
and Valdez were charged with, among other things, violations of 8
U.S.C. §1324 (a)(2)(B)(iii), the Immigration and Naturalization statute
that criminalizes bringing aliens into the United States illegally.9
While Perez and Valdez did bring undocumented aliens10 into the
United States, they asked all but one of the passengers to see their
identification and there was no reason for them to know that any of these
people did not actually have authorization to be in the United States.11
Yet, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
found Perez and Valdez guilty of violating § 1324(a)(2), and the
Eleventh Circuit later affirmed.12 As a result of the Eleventh Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute, Perez’s helpful actions cost him his
reputation and placed him on trial for a crime that he may have
unknowingly committed.13
The Eleventh Circuit’s reading of
§ 1324(a)(2) does not require knowledge of an alien’s lack of
authorization to enter the United States, but rather calls for knowledge or
a mere reckless disregard of the fact.14
Yet, not all jurisdictions agree with this determination.15 In other
federal circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, to be found culpable under
§ 1324(a)(2), there must be more than simply the acts that constitute the
offense.16 In order to be culpable, one must possess a specific intent to
violate the statute.17 The inconsistent application of the mens rea
requirement is problematic, and requires courts to constantly apply their
own interpretation of what they think the mens rea requirement means or
7

Id.
Id. at 775.
9
Perez, 443 F.3d at 774.
10
For a discussion regarding the use of the terminology “undocumented aliens” as
opposed to “illegal aliens” or “illegal immigrants,” and the connotations and sentiments
that accompany each term see generally Roque Planas, Jose Antonio Vargas Restarts
‘Illegal’ v. ‘Undocumented” Debates, Highlighting Role of Latino Media, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 27, 2012) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/jose-antonio-vargasillegal-undocumented_n_1918631.html; See also Ilona Bray, NOLO BLOG, ( Sept. 27,
2012) http://blog.nolo.com/immigration/2012/09/25/should-the-media-use-the-term-illeg
al-alien/.
11
Perez, 443 F.3d at 774.
12
Id. at 782.
13
Id. at 779.
14
See United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1070 (11th Cir. 2011).
15
Id.
16
United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 1999).
17
Id.
8
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should mean.18 Resolving the conflicting applications of the mens rea
standard is necessary to appropriately punish the types of behavior that
Congress intended, without harshly punishing innocent actors.19 The
Supreme Court should address this issue and clarify what the applicable
mens rea standard is. On its face, the statute does not require a specific
mental intent or willful violation.20 Another way to clarify the current
confusion is to revise the statute, and use different language to make it
clear to reviewing courts that a person’s actions must rise, at minimum,
to reckless disregard in order for them to be appropriately punished
under the statute. Possible revisions to the statute may include looking at
a different standard to determine culpability, or adopting a points system
that mimics the aggravating and mitigating factors of the Model Penal
Code.
This comment examines the language of 8 U.S.C § 1324(a)(2),
address the current disagreement regarding the applicable mens rea
standard among the circuits that have addressed this issue, and propose
possible revisions to the statute that can help to resolve the issue. Part II
looks to the language and history of the statute as well as the current split
among the different federal circuits. Part III analyzes public policy
concerns involved in the consideration of § 1324(a)(2) and immigration
policy on a whole. Finally, Part IV contains proposed solutions to the
statutory issue.
II. THE CURRENT LANGUAGE AND APPLICATION OF § 1324(A)(2)
a. The Impact of the “Mariel Boatlift” and the Transition Toward the
Current Statute
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) was created in
1952.21 Prior to 1952, immigration law had never been collected and
codified into a single body of law.22 The INA is included in the United
States Code and has undergone many revisions since.23 One significant
revision of the INA took place in 1986, when Congress substantially
rewrote § 1324 to expand the scope of activities punishable under the
18

Brett Sabbag, Case Comment, Transnational Criminal Law—Eleventh Circuit
Does Not Require Proof of Criminal Intent for Alien Smuggling Offenses—United States
v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011), 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 493,
502 (2012).
19
See id. at 498.
20
Id.
21
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigra
tion-and-nationality-act (last visited March 5, 2014).
22
Id.
23
Id.

Spring 2014]

Settling the Law For Eduin Rodriguez

413

statute.24 The revisions were a part of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), which was one piece of a significant
reform of immigration law and policy.25
IRCA was enacted partially in response to what is historically
known as the “Mariel Boatlift,” and was an attempt to exercise control
over persistent unauthorized entry by foreign aliens and “close the back
door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration
remains open.” 26 Toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, the
United States embraced an “open arms” policy towards Cuban refugees
who had been experiencing economic hardships and political turmoil in
Cuba.27 As a result of this open policy, approximately 125,000 Cuban
aliens fled to the United States over the course of roughly six months
during 1980.28 The Immigration and Naturalization Service was not
prepared to handle such a large number of arriving aliens.29 Processing,
overseeing, and managing an excessively large number of Cuban aliens,
as well as all of the other applicants seeking entry and status, proved to
be a very significant burden and caused the Service to suffer because of
it.30 Congress then enacted § 1324(a)(2) to further criminalize bringing
undocumented persons into the United States.31
b. The Previous Version of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) Created a Gap in
Immigration Law
With the addition to § 1324(a), Congress intended to expand the
scope of the activities that are punishable.32 At that time, many members
of Congress found judicial opinions concerning the prosecution of
persons assisting the unlawful entry of Cuban aliens during the Mariel
Boatlift to be troubling.33 Generally, these opinions found that the
immigration statutes as they existed did not penalize those actions that
are “clearly prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” 34 The case

24

H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 65 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5669.
H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 45, supra note 22, at 5649.
26
Id.
27
United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1079 (quoting Nation: Open Heart, Open
Arms, TIME, May 19, 1980 at 14).
28
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, Alien Migrant Interdiction, http://www.uscg.mil/hq
/cg5/cg531/AMIO/mariel.asp (last visited 05/17/14).
29
H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 65, supra note 22, at 5669.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 5670.
32
Id. at 5669.
33
Id.
34
Id.
25
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of United States v. Zayas-Morales35 is one example that Congress cited
that highlights the troubling outcomes that the statute produced.36
In Zayas-Morales, the Eleventh Circuit considered the culpability
of captains and owners of the vessels used to transport Cuban nationals
to the United States during the Mariel Boatlift, also historically known as
the “Freedom Flotilla.”37 The pertinent immigration statute as it existed
at the time was 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1).38 In analyzing whether the
defendants possessed the requisite criminal intent to violate the statute,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that even though subsection (a)(1) did not
include a specific criminal intent, subsections (2), (3), and (4) did in fact
include knowledge requirements that should be imputed to subsection
(1). Further, relevant case law has held that state of mind is an essential
element of proving the statute.39 Ultimately, the circuit court found that
the actions of the defendants were not punishable under § 1324(a)
because, while the defendants did bring undocumented aliens into the
United States, they did so based upon the aliens’ representation that they
35

United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982).
H.R. REP. No. 99-682, 66, supra note 22, at 5670.
Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d at 1273–74.
38
The previous version of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) provided:
Any person who, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding
officer, agent or Consignee of any means of transportation who –
(1)
Brings into or lands in the United States, by any means
of transportation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or
through another, to bring into or land in the United States, by
any means of transportation or otherwise;
(2)
Knowing that he is in the United States in violation of
law, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that
his entry into the United States occurred less than three years
prior thereto, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or
move, within the United States by means of transportation or
otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law;
(3)
Willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields
from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from
detection, in any place, including any building or any means of
transportation or;
(4)
Willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or
attempts to encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly,
the entry into the United States of –
Any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an immigration
officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States
under the terms of this chapter or any other law relating to the immigration
or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2000 or by imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to
whom any violation of this subsection occurs . . . .
Id. at 1274 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (1976)).
39
Id. at 1277.
36
37
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would seek legal status in the country; in fact, each Cuban alien was
brought directly to immigration officials upon entry.40 The Eleventh
Circuit found that a criminal mind was such an essential element to a
violation of § 1324(a), that without the intent to violate the statute, it was
impossible to do so.41
A majority in Congress found the results of Zayas-Morales
troubling because it presented a gap in immigration law, where
committing an illegal act that impacted the interests of the United States
went unpunished and left open the possibility that undocumented
immigrants could flood the country via its ports of entry with minimal
consequences to those who assisted them.42 Thus, Congress amended 8
U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2), which in its current form provides:
Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that
an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to,
enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring
to the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien,
regardless of any official action which may later be taken with
respect to such alien, for each alien in respect to whom a
violation of this paragraph occurs—
(A)
be fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned
not more than one year,or both; or
B) in the case of—
(i) an offense committed with the intent or with
reason to believe that the alien unlawfully brought
into the United States will commit an offense
against the United States or any State punishable by
imprisonment for more than 1 year,
(ii) an offense done for the purpose of commercial
advantage or private financial gain, or
(iii) an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival
immediately brought and presented to an appropriate
immigration officer at a designated port of entry,
be fined under Title 18 and shall be imprisoned, in the case of a
first or second violation of subparagraph (B)(iii), not more than
40
41
42

Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. 99-682, supra note 22, at 5670.
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10 years, in the case of a first or second violation of
subparagraph (B)(i) or (B)(ii), not less than 3 nor more than 10
years, and for any other violation, not less than 5 nor more than
15 years.43

By substantially rewriting the existing statute and adding subsection
(a)(2), Congress tried to deter the transportation of undocumented aliens
into the United States and significantly reduce the amount of smuggling
offenses committed each year.44 Notably, subsection (a)(2) applies to
those who act in “knowing or reckless disregard” of an alien’s prior
authorization.
The Supreme Court has defined “knowingly” as meaning that the
offender knew the facts constituting their offense, although the court
does not always require that the offender know that the act itself is
illegal.45 Unless the language of a statute indicates otherwise, the term
“knowingly” simply requires proof that the defendant knew of the facts
that constitute the offense.46 “Reckless disregard,” the new language of
§ 1324(a), has been defined as a conscious awareness but deliberate
indifference to facts and circumstances that, if properly considered,
indicate a probability that the alien did not have authorization to enter the
United States.47 If Congress intended to dispense with a mens rea
element of the statute, and simply make § 1324(a)(2) a strict liability
offense, then there would necessarily have to be an indication of such an
intent.48 The language of the statute indicates that culpable actions can
be done “knowingly” or in “reckless disregard,”49 meaning actions done
without a specific, criminal intent to violate the statute may still violate it
nonetheless.
c. Conflicting Interpretations of the New § 1324(a)(2)
Most of the current case law concerning the mental intent necessary
to violate subsection (a)(2) comes from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.
43

8 U.S.C. § 2314(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. 99-682, supra note 22, at 5670.
Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed Methodology For
Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 521, 523–24 (1999) (“[A]lthough the Court has
consistently defined ‘knowingly’ to require that the defendant actually knew he
committed the acts that made his conduct criminal . . . when the Court hears a case
involving a statute that criminalizes morally suspect behavior, it defines ‘knowingly’ to
require only that the defendant knew he acted, regardless of whether the defendant knew
those actions were illegal.”; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 623 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
46
Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998).
47
United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 781 (11th Cir. 2006).
48
Staples, 511 U.S. at 605.
49
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2) (2012).
44
45
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Their decisions have created a circuit split concerning the applicable
mens rea that the statute requires. On its face, the plain language of the
statute does not require a willful violation of the law to establish a
punishable offense; rather, it simply calls for a violation done
“knowingly” or with “reckless disregard.” 50 However, the application of
the statute has been inconsistent at best arbitrary at worst.
d. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of whether
or not § 1324 (a)(2) required willful conduct, an issue that had not
previously been addressed by the courts.51 In United States v. BarajasMontiel, the Ninth Circuit considered the mental intent required to
convict the defendant of bringing undocumented aliens into the United
States for financial gain in violation of the felony provision of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (a)(2)(B).52 The defendant had been involved in an operation in
which she helped facilitate the unauthorized entry of over twenty aliens,
and had received several thousands of dollars in payment for her
services.53 She was convicted of, among other charges, six counts of
violation of § 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii).54
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that no circuit court had
previously addressed the issue of the mens rea required under § 1324
(a)(2).55 Because the mens rea requirement for the particular subsection
that the defendant was convicted under had not previously been
considered by a court, the defendant argued that the court should apply
the same mens rea standard that the Ninth Circuit applied in United
50

See Sabbag, supra note 16, at 498.
United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 1999).
52
Id.
53
See Id. at 949–51. On multiple occasions, police surveillance observed BarajasMontiel with her brother Everardo Barajas (“Everardo”), driving two separate vehicles in
tandem. Id. at 949. On each occasion, Barajas-Montiel followed her brother’s vehicle,
while driving a car with its rear suspension lifted, to a remote location. Id. When BarajaMontiel’s vehicle reappeared, each time the rear suspension no longer appeared to be
lifted. Id. On the first occasion, police surveillance discovered Barajas-Montiel and
Everardo arrive at Barajas-Montiel’s residence and exit their vehicles.
Id.
Approximately eight to ten Hispanic men also exited the vehicles, none of whom had
been visible prior to that moment. Id. On another occasion, Barajas-Montiel, her
boyfriend Raul Esquival-Castillo (“Raul”), and Everardo were spotted by police driving
three separate vehicles along the same route that Barajas-Montiel and Everardo had taken
on the first occasion. Id. This time, police followed the three vehicles, and arrived at a
residence where they apprehended twenty undocumented aliens. Id. at 950. A search of
Barajas-Montiel’s residence revealed over $8000 and numerous records bearing BarajasMontiel’s name. Id.
54
Id. at 950.
55
Id. at 951.
51
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States v Nguyen,56 in which the subsection in question was section
1324(a)(1)(A).57 In Nguyen, the court considered whether the defendant
violated § 1324 (a)(1)(A) by bringing aliens into the United States at a
location other than a designated port of entry.58 Nguyen was a mechanic
on a vessel that was used to bring more than one hundred unauthorized
aliens into the United States. While the defendant had been suspicious of
the legal status of some of the people onboard, he did not interfere with
the actions of those who were in charge of the smuggling scheme.59 In
that case, the Ninth Circuit determined that, even though Congress
substantially rewrote § 1324 in 1986 to expand the scope of proscribed
activity under the statute, based on widely accepted common law notions
of statutory interpretation it was highly unlikely that Congress intended
IRCA to dispense with a mens rea requirement.60 As such, the court held
that for a conviction under subsection (a)(1), there must be proof of
criminal intent.61
In Barajas-Montiel, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the reasoning that
Congress was unlikely to have intended to dispense with a mental intent
element in the revised language of subsection (a)(2). It determined that
looking to the prior treatment of another subsection of the same
immigration statue was the best way to infer the appropriate mens rea
standard.62 In particular, the court noted that the statute bears significant
overlap between crimes punished under (a)(1) and (a)(2) as well as
significant punishments under both.63 The court refused to dispense with
mental intent as a critical element of the felony provision of (a)(2)
because of the potential for lengthy and serious penalties for potentially
innocent persons who technically violate the statute.64 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit held that a specific intent to violate United States
immigration laws is required with respect to § 1324 (a)(2)(B).65
Since coming to this determination, the Ninth Circuit has
consistently held that a conviction under § 1324(a)(2) requires a showing
of specific intent, even though this determination seems to clearly fly in
the face of the specifically enumerated mens rea requirement in the
language of the statute. For example, in the case of United States v.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1995).
Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 951.
Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 889.
Id. at 899–90.
Id. at 893.
Id.
Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 951–52.
Id. at 953.
Id.
Id.
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Dixon,66 Terrill Dixon was convicted for bringing an undocumented alien
into the United States67 under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)68 and (iii).69
Dixon contested the jury instructions used in his case, claiming that they
were not sufficient to convey to the jury that his guilt under subsection
(a)(2)(B)(ii) must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.70 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the jury instructions used in Dixon’s case
were in fact sufficient because they clearly specified that “a defendant
must be shown to have acted with criminal intent to be guilty” of the
charge,71 thereby emphasizing the essential nature of the mens rea
element for a conviction under the statute.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit looks for clear evidence that is
demonstrative of a specific intent to violate the statute. In the case of
United States v. Singh,72 Singh was convicted of several crimes
connected to smuggling violations including an offense under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).73 Kavel Multani arranged the smuggling scheme,
and the first step was for Apla Patel and another one of the aliens
involved in the scheme to walk across the U.S./Canadian border from
British Columbia to Seattle.74 Singh then met Patel at the Sea-Tac Inn
near the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.75 Singh used his taxi to
pick her up, and the following day Singh used a credit card to purchase
two tickets for Patel and himself to travel to New York.76 Upon arrival
in New York, they met Patel’s husband and Singh received his
payment.77 In considering whether Singh possessed the requisite specific
intent necessary to establish a violation of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), the court
66

201 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. Dixon was stopped by Customs Inspector Sherman Lee for inspection upon
entry into the United States from Mexico. When Inspector Lee requested that Dixon
provide him with the keys so that he could further inspect the vehicle, Dixon did not
comply and drove off. Officers later found Dixon’s car apparently unoccupied; however,
upon inspection, the officers discovered two Mexican aliens in the car’s hatchback. Id.
68
Section 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii) provides criminal penalties for a person who brings an
alien who has not received prior official authorization into the United States “for the
purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(2012).
69
Section 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) provides criminal penalties for a person who brings an
alien who has not received prior official authorization into the United States and “the
alien is not upon arrival immediately brought and presented to an appropriate
immigration officer at a designated port of entry.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012).
70
Id. at 1231–32.
71
Id. at 1231 (emphasis added).
72
United States v. Singh, 532 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008).
73
Id. at 1056.
74
Id. at 1055.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1055–56.
77
Id. 1056.
67
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noted that merely showing that a defendant “was associated with
someone who was involved with a smuggling operation in some
unknown way or that [they] were associated with the transportation of
the aliens within the United States after the fact of smuggling was
insufficient to show that she had the specific intent” to commit the
offense.78 The court placed emphasis on the fact that though Singh’s “act
of transporting an alien commenced only after the ‘brings to’ offense was
completed,” Singh had agreed ahead of time to assist in transporting an
alien in the United States thereby indicating that the offense was
something “he wished to bring about.”79 On this basis, the court found
that Singh did possess the specific intent under the facts shown, and was
as punishable as the principal in the smuggling scheme.80
In United States v. Yoshida,81 the Ninth Circuit considered what
level of involvement might serve as sufficient evidence of a mental intent
to violate the statute.82 Yuami Yoshida was convicted under 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1324 (a)(1)(A)(iv) and (a)(2)(B)(ii) for assisting three Chinese
citizens’ entry into the United States.83 The aliens were on a three-part
journey to the United States, with their flight leaving from Narita Airport
in Japan.84 In Narita Airport, an escort that met the aliens pointed to
Yoshida and told them that Yoshida would be their escort for the next leg
of the journey.85 The aliens followed Yoshida towards their flight, and
they were the last people to board.86 Upon arrival, authorities found
Yoshida’s journey and frequent traveling as indicated by her passport to
be suspicious.87 Yoshida never spoke with the aliens in question88;
however, she was believed to have brought them into the United States
for financial gain in violation of § 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii).89 In her defense,
Yoshida argued that airline employees allowed the aliens to board a
plane and travel to the United States, that she did not have knowledge
that the aliens lacked authorization to enter the country and therefore, she
conversely presumed that they did.90 However, the court concluded that
“Delta Airlines employees do not have the authority to admit aliens into
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Singh, 532 F.3d at 1058.
Id. at 1058–59.
Id. at 1057–58.
United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id.
Yoshida, 303 F.3d at 1149.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id. at 1152.
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the United States, and the fact that Delta allowed the aliens onto the
flight does not negate the evidence that Yoshida knew or recklessly
disregarded the fact that the aliens did not have authorization to enter the
United States.” 91 The mere fact that the aliens were able to board the
plane was not sufficient to give Yoshida reasonable cause to believe that
they were authorized to enter the United States, and a jury could
reasonably infer criminal intent from Yoshida’s actions.92
e. The Eleventh Circuit’s Different Approach to the Mens Rea
Requirement, Creating a Circuit Split
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit also considered the question of the
mental intent necessary to violate 8 U.S.C. 1324 § (a)(2), and in making
its determination, created a circuit split.93 In the case of United States v.
Dominguez, Gustavo Dominguez was convicted under the felony
provision of U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2).94 In November of 2003, Dominguez,
a sports agent working for Total Sports International (“TSI”), made an
agreement with Ysbel Medina-Santos (“Medina”) to smuggle two Cuban
nationals into the United States in exchange for 5% of any Major League
Baseball contract that the players would potentially sign.95 The attempt
to smuggle the players was successful, as was the Major League
recruiting.96 Then, in July of 2004 Dominguez contacted Medina and
asked him to smuggle five Cuban baseball players into the United
States.97 After two smuggle attempts, the players were successfully
brought into the country through Miami, and traveled to Los Angeles
where they were to meet with Dominguez.98 Dominguez then had the
players meet with an experienced immigration attorney who had been
conducting work for TSI for a number of years, and began to process the
players through immigration.99 During this time, TSI placed the players
in an apartment complex, arranged for the players to attend try-outs with
Major League Baseball scouts, and even participated in the filming of a
documentary about Cuban baseball players in the United States.100
Dominguez was convicted of—among other offenses—conspiring
to, aiding and abetting the attempt to, and aiding and abetting the
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id. at 1153.
United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1076 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1056–57.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id. at 1057–58.
Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1058.
Id. at 1058–59.
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successful bringing of aliens to the United States for the purpose of
commercial advantage and private financial gain in violation of
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).101 Interestingly, Dominguez argued that he believed
that the Cuban Adjustment Act102 and the Wet-Foot/ Dry-Foot policy was
a basis for the players to have legal authorization to enter the United
States.103 Because of his belief that Cuban nationals were granted special
treatment pursuant to these immigration laws and policies, Dominguez
felt that he lacked the requisite mental intent necessary for a conviction
under § 1324 (a)(2).104
However, the court rejected Dominguez’ argument,105 and
determined that Dominguez’s knowledge of the Cuban Adjustment Act’s
policies and the beliefs that came from them were not enough to
exculpate him from liability under § 1324(a)(2).106 First, the Eleventh
Circuit sought to determine the applicable mens rea standard for a
conviction. Though the court previously determined that mental intent
was required for offenses under section 1324(a) in Zayas-Morales,107 the
statute was substantially rewritten in 1986 and therefore, the court felt
compelled to revisit the same question under the new language of the
statute.108 The court considered the prior determination in ZayasMorales, the new language of the statute, and the determination made by
the Ninth Circuit, the only other circuit to address this question.109
Specifically, although the court considered the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion in Barajas-Montiel—which held that specific criminal intent

101

Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1059–60. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1966)for the adjustment of a
Cuban native’s status from alien to permanent resident if they have resided in the United
States for two or more years).
103
Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1067 (“United States immigration law and policy afford
special treatment to Cuban nationals who come to the United States. Under the Cuban
Adjustment Act, a native or citizen of Cuba, who has been inspected and admitted or
paroled into the United States and has been physically present in the United States for at
least two years, can apply for permanent residency in the United States. By taking
advantage of the CAA, Cuban nationals, who have no documents authorizing their
presence in the United States, can remain in the United States without demonstrating that
they suffered persecution or proving refugee status. The benefits of the CAA, however,
can only apply to those Cubans who reach United States soil (those with ‘dry feet’) while
Cubans who are interdicted at sea (those with ‘wet feet’) are repatriated to Cuba. This
rule is commonly referred to as the ‘Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot’ Policy.”).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1070.
107
Id. at 1069.
108
Id. at 1070.
109
Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1070.
102
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is a necessary element—it found the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
unconvincing.110
The Eleventh Circuit looked to Congress’s intent to expand the
scope of the activities considered criminal under the statute, as well as
the fact that the language of the statute itself indicates that conduct done
“knowingly” or in “reckless disregard” would satisfy the mens rea
requirement.111 This led the court to believe that Congress never meant
to impose a specific intent requirement.112 Even before Dominguez, the
Eleventh Circuit had supported the notion that each word in a statute
contributes to its meaning as a whole113 and thus it is consistent with the
Eleventh Circuit’s notions of statutory interpretation to draw upon the
plain meaning of each word in the statute. Further, the court noted that
the Cuban Adjustment Act and Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policies114 did not
officially authorize all Cuban nationals to enter the United States at their
will; but rather they provided a means to take official action prior to
entry, which § 1324(a)(2) makes clear is not an excuse for violation of
the statute.115 For these reasons, Dominguez’s argument failed and the
mens rea element, knowing or in reckless disregard, was satisfied for his
offense.116 The Eleventh Circuit’s position in Dominguez, disagreeing
with the Ninth Circuit’s position, resulted in a circuit split.
Like the Ninth Circuit in Yoshida, the Eleventh Circuit has
similarly determined that evidence of mens rea is determined on the basis
of what a jury reasonably believes the defendant knew and intended.117
In United States v. Kendrick, the Eleventh Circuit considered the district
court’s dismissal of Kendrick’s motion for a judgment of acquittal of the
charges brought against him under § 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii).118 Kendrick was
charged with, among other things, bringing an alien who did not have
prior official authorization to enter into the United States for personal
financial gain in conjunction with marijuana trafficking.119 When the
other charges against him were dropped, Kendrick moved for a judgment
of acquittal for the remaining charge under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).120 The
court denied Kendrick’s motion and the jury ultimately found him guilty
110

Id.
Id.
112
Id.
113
United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1258 (2009) (Bartlett, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Canals-Jiminez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991)).
114
See Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1067.
115
Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1258. (Bartlett, J., dissenting).
116
Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1070.
117
United States v. Kendrick, 682 F.3d 974, 985 (11th Cir. 2012).
118
Id. at 978.
119
Id. at 978–79.
120
Id.
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424

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:409

of the smuggling charge.121 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Kendrick
possessed the requisite mental intent to actually violate the statute.122
Importantly, the court held that the standard was met if there was
sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that Kendrick knew
or was in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien he was transporting
did not have authorization.123 The court found that, based upon the
record, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to draw such an
inference.124
f. The Fifth and Second Circuits Examine Whether “Knowing” Means
Knowing That the Alien Had Valid Prior Authorization
One issue in determining whether knowledge regarding a lack of
prior authorization is an essential element of the statute is determining
whether that knowledge simply concerns authorization or if its scope
extends to knowledge regarding the authenticity of the authorization. In
United States v. Gasanova,125 the Fifth Circuit considered whether a
person charged with a violation of § 1324(a)(2) could demonstrate that
the alien brought into the country was authorized to enter when the
authorization was obtained fraudulently.126 The court took issue with the
lack of clarity regarding the term “official authorization” in § 1324(a)(2),
and questioned whether it was a violation of the statute to bring an alien
in to the country if the defendant knows that the alien holds a valid visa
obtained through fraud or artifice.127 It remained unclear whether an
official-looking document, even if fraudulent, is sufficient to prove that a
defendant was not in violation of the statute, as long as they believed that
the alien they were bringing in to the United States did in fact have prior
official authorization.128
Given the dearth of guidance in congressional materials or case law
to inform its decision, the Fifth Circuit had to look to the purpose of
IRCA, which led to the revision of the statute, in order to try to
understand the meaning of “official authorization.”129 The court found
that assisting an alien with a visa that is fraudulent but in fact appears to
be authentic goes against the very intentions of IRCA, and constitutes a
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id.
Id. at 985.
Kendrick, 682 F.3d at 985.
Id.
United States v. Gasanova, 332 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 299.
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violation of § 1324(a)(2); this is because the assisting person may have,
or should have, known that the documents were fraudulent and therefore,
the alien had no prior authorization to enter the United States.130
The Second Circuit considered a similar question in the case of
United States v. Calhelha.131 In Calhelha, the defendants argued that
they did not violate U.S. immigration law because while they did bring
an unauthorized alien into the country, the alien had a government-issued
visa, although it was obtained through fraudulent means.132 Citing the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gasanova, the Second Circuit found that this
interpretation flies in the face of the “fundamental purpose” of the
statute, and would enable violations of immigration law.133 Though the
language of the case law does not specifically enumerate the standard
applied, the Fifth and Second Circuit’s approach embraces the “reckless
disregard” element of the statute, and finds culpability even where there
may not clearly be a specific intent to violate the statute by bringing an
alien into the country literally without any authorization.134
g. Mens Rea is a Critical Component of Criminal Law and Should Be a
Necessary Part of Immigration Statutes with Criminal Punishments
Immigration violations are generally considered to be violations of
civil law, not criminal
law.135 However, the law provides criminal punishments for certain
violations.136 Taking in to account that § 1324(a)(2) provides criminal
punishment for offenses that fall within its ambit, the varying ways in
which courts interpret and apply the mens rea requirement have created
significant inconsistencies in the execution of immigration policy and
criminal law.

130

Id.
456 F. Supp.2d 350 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 358.
133
Id.
134
See Calhelha, 456 F. Supp.2d at 358; Gasanova, 332 F.3d at 299.
135
See generally Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police, NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION FORUM, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/11652.pdf
(last accessed May 17, 2014); Christie clarifies: ‘Illegal’ Immigrants are in civil
violation, NEW JERSEY (Apr., 8 2008) http://nj.com/morisstown/index.ssf/morristown
/index.html; Ilona Bray, NOLO BLOG (Sept. 25, 2012) http://blog.nolo.com/immigration
/2012/09/25/should-the-media-use-the-term-illegal-alien/.
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See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (2012); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH & LEE
L. REV. 469, PINCITE (2007).
131
132

426

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:409

According to the Supreme Court, when criminal statutes contain
ambiguities, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.137
Black’s Law Dictionary defines lenity as “[t]he quality or condition of
being lenient; mercy or clemency.”138 Thus, ambiguities in criminal
statutes should be resolved towards a more lenient punishment.139 The
interpretation of a civil immigration statute with criminal penalties for
offenses, then, becomes decidedly more complicated when trying to
glean the applicable mens rea.
The Supreme Court has also stated that criminal offenses
containing no mens rea requirement are generally disfavored.140 The
Ninth Circuit concluded in Barajas-Montiel that, because of this,
Congress was unlikely to have dispensed with a mens rea requirement
when it revised § 1324(a).141 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit believes
that the mental intent language of “knowing” and “reckless disregard”
used in the statute actually constitutes a mens rea requirement, and found
this to be sufficient to satisfy the mens rea presumption that is generally
attached to statutes that provide for criminal punishment.142 Further, the
Second Circuit has also found that in the context of immigration
offenses, the use of “reckless disregard” as a mens rea element is
sufficient.143
h. The U.K. Model: A Comparison to the Use of Mens Rea In A Foreign
Analog
The United States has always been an attractive location for
migration. For decades,
Congress and the federal government have struggled to implement
policies that control immigration and enforce the security of U.S.
borders.144 However, the problem of illegal immigration is hardly
exclusive to the United States. As other nations face similar problems of
unauthorized entry, foreign laws have also been implemented regarding
the control and punishment of illegal immigration. A look at the foreign
analogs to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) will highlight the efficiencies and
limitations of U.S. immigration policy.
137

Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S.
81, 83 (1955).
138
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), lenity.
139
See generally Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), rule of lenity.
140
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985).
141
United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1999).
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See generally United States v Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011).
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United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Brianna Lee, The U.S. Immigration Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
(January 24, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/immigration/us-immigration-debate/p11149.
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Section 25 of the United Kingdom’s Immigration Act of 1971
(“Section 25”), assisting unlawful immigration to member states, is the
most comparable statute to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2).145 The language
punishes an action that facilitates the breach of an immigration law by
someone who is not a citizen of the European Union, who knows or has
reasonable cause to know that the act would facilitate the breach, and
knows or has reasonable cause for believing the individual is not a
citizen.146 Subsection (1)(c) requires that the offender know or have
reasonable cause for believing that the individual is not a citizen of the
European Union.147 The language “know or have reasonable cause for
believing”148 appears to be the mens rea element of Section 25, which is
a mild contrast to the “knowing or in reckless disregard”149 language of
§ 1324(a)(2).150 The main difference between the mens rea elements of
the two statutes comes down to the difference between “reasonable cause
to believe” and “reckless disregard.” As previously noted, both the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits have determined that the appropriate standard for
determining knowledge or reckless disregard is one of reasonableness, as
determined by a jury.151 This is similar to the mental intent element laid
out by the United Kingdom. While the United Kingdom standard of
“reasonable cause to believe” seems to be a more lenient mental state
standard to prove than “reckless disregard,” both statutes make room for
looking past what actual knowledge a defendant possesses. Both call for
an evaluation of what would have been reasonable for the defendant to
know or believe about the legal status of the alien involved in the
offense.
Another significant difference between the illegal entry policies of
the United States and the United Kingdom is the exception made for
145

See generally Immigration Act, 1971, c.77, § 25 (UK).
§ 25 Assisting unlawful immigration to member State
(1) A person commits an offence if he—
a.
Does an act which facilitates the commission of a
breach of immigration law by an individual who is not a
citizen of the European Union,
b.
Knows or has reasonable cause for believing that the act
facilitates the commission of a breach of immigration law by
the individual, and
c.
Knows or has reasonable cause for believing that the
individual is not a citizen of the European Union.
Immigration Act, 1971, c.77, § 25, sch. 1 (UK).
147
Immigration Act, 1971, c.77, § 25 (UK)
148
Id.
149
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2) (2012).
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§ 25 Immigration Act of 1971, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/77.
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United States v. Kendrick, 682 F.3d 974, 985 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002).
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those with innocent and/or humanitarian intentions. In the United
Kingdom, the Immigration Act of 1971 includes a separate provision for
those who assisted or facilitated entry of an alien into a member state for
the purposes of asylum claims.152 The statute provides that only those
who knowingly and for gain facilitate the entry of an asylum-seeker are
punishable, excluding those who assist asylum-seekers for no gain.153
The language of the statute specifically enumerates that organizations
that assist asylum seekers and do not charge for their services cannot be
penalized under Section 25A.154 This provision is in stark contrast to the
United States illegal entry policy, which criminalizes all persons who
facilitate the illegal entry of an alien who do not have prior official
authorization, regardless of any subsequent official action taken.155
Therefore, a violation of U.S. immigration law will occur even if the
alien in question is an asylum-seeker or eligible for asylum.156
Like § 1324, the United Kingdom’s Section 25 includes a list of
potentially aggravating factors.157 Among these are repeat offending,
involving strangers instead of family members, a high degree of
sophistication, the level of involvement of the offender, the number of
immigrants involved, etc.158 Section 1324(a)(2) provides for increased
punishment with a minimum of one year and a maximum of fifteen years
of imprisonment for a violation of the statute with the intent that the alien
will violate the laws of the United states generally, a violation of the
statute done for commercial or private gain, or a violation of the statute
after which the alien is not brought to immigration officers immediately
upon arrival.159 The factors listed in Section 25 seem to take into account
152

See Section 25A of Immigration Act 1971, which provides:
(1) Helping asylum-seeker to enter United Kingdom
a.
He knowingly and for gain facilitates the arrival in the
United Kingdom of an individual, and
b.
He knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
individual is an asylum-seeker.
...
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to anything done by a person acting on
behalf of an organization which—
a.
Aims to assist asylum-seekers, and
b.
Does not charge for its services.
Immigration Act, 1971, c.77, § 25, sch. 1, 2 (UK).
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Id.
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Id.
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8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2) (2012).
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KIM, YULE; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34501, ALIEN SMUGGLING: RECENT
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS, May 22, 2008.
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Immigration Act, 1971, c.77, § 25 (UK), supra note 152.
158
Id.
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the extent of the offenders’ involvement and their positive or negative
intentions, while the factors enumerated in § 1324(a)(2) are more general
and broad.
III. MOVING TOWARD A SOLUTION
a. Additional Reasons Why § 1324(a) Should be Revised
In addition to the circuit split, which represents a lack of clarity and
the inconsistent application of the law, there are other issues with
§ 1324(a) that need to be addressed. For example, in United States v.
Assadi,160 the District Court for the District of Columbia noted that
interpreting the ordinary meaning of § 1324 (a)(2)(B)’s language was
problematic.161 The court found the words “bringing to” particularly
troublesome, and questioned whether accompanying an alien to the
American border, yet not crossing with them, constitutes “bringing to”
and is thereby a violation of the statute.162 The court noted that Congress
made adjustments to the statute’s language several times, highlighting
the complex history that has followed the initial enactment.163 If the
mens rea required by the statute is not the only aspect of the statute that
has been unclear to reviewing courts, then it is not surprising that judicial
application of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) has been inconsistent. While the
main focus of this comment is to bring much needed attention to the
inconsistent application of the statute with regards to the mens rea
requirement, revision of the statute would give Congress an opportunity
to address the other areas of confusion.
b. The Supreme Court Should Clarify the Mental Intent Requirement of
§ 1324(a) to Allow for More Equitable and Uniform Application
The current circuit split is problematic because it engenders the
inconsistent application of federal law, and in effect allows potential
smugglers to strategically plan their actions in a way that will produce a

160
161
162
163

(i) [A]n offense committed with the intent or with reason to believe that the
alien unlawfully brought into the United States will commit an offense
against the United States or any State punishable by imprisonment for more
than 1 year,
(ii) [A]n offense done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private
financial gain, or
(iii) [A]n offense in which the alien is not upon arrival immediately brought
and presented to an appropriate immigration officer.
United States v. Assadi, 223 F.Supp.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id.
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favorable outcome for them if prosecuted.164 In the Ninth Circuit,
individuals prosecuted under § 1324(a) may be able to evade punishment
by claiming that they did not intend to violate the provision.165 In
Dominguez, if the alleged violation of § 1324 (a)(2) had taken place
under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit rather than the Eleventh,
Dominguez’s claim that he believed the aliens he brought into the United
States were authorized to be here because of the CAA and the WetFoot/Dry-Foot policy could have been viable evidence that he did not
intend to violate the statute.166 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit’s stricter
interpretation of the statute, calling for punishment even in the absence
of willful behavior, runs the risk of punishing innocent actors.167
Because of this disagreement among the circuits, the Supreme Court
should address this issue in order to allow for consistent application of
the statute among the lower courts.
Generally, courts defer to Congress as being in control of the
creation and meaning of statutes.168 In fact, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the “definition of the elements of a criminal
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.”169 Accordingly, if the
Supreme Court tries to resolve the circuit split, the Court would likely
first consider the plain language of the statute and then the congressional
intent in order to determine the most appropriate mens rea requirement.
To determine Congressional intent, the court might look to legislative
history such as House Reports, which demonstrate the concerns that
prompted the creation of the statute, as well as discussions of the
motivations behind it and what the goals of the statute are. House Report
Number 99-682 describes illegal immigration concerns, and specifically
explains that Congress felt statutory amendments were necessary to
control borders, prevent the unlawful employment of aliens and prevent
public assistance abuse by aliens.170 Further, congressional records from

164

See Brett Sabbag, Case Comment, Transnational Criminal Law—Eleventh Circuit
Does Not Require Proof of Criminal Intent for Alien Smuggling Offenses—United States
v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011), 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 493,
502 (2012).; see also Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1099–1101 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
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See Sabbag, supra n. 16, at 501-502; Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1099-1101.
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See United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149 (2000).
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Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985).
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See generally H.R. REP. No. 99-682, supra note 22 (explaining the current
concerns regarding illegal immigration and the ways in which the new legislation are
important for immigration reform).
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the month that § 1324 was amended contain dialogue among senators
whose concerns regarding immigration control led to the amendment.171
Congress revised and substantially rewrote the language of
§ 1324(a) in order to expand the activities that are punishable under its
scope,172 and in doing so expanded the acceptable mental intent
necessary to satisfy the mens rea element of the offense.173 Congress did
not mean to dispense with a mens rea element altogether, but wrote
§ 1324(a)(2) to apply to more people than those who knew the aliens
they were bringing in lacked prior authorization.174 The statute lays out
the mens rea standard as “knowingly or in reckless disregard.”175 While
there is a mens rea standard already in the language of the statute, a
reviewing court is unlikely to try to infer and apply a different
standard.176 If the Supreme Court decides to remedy the circuit split, it is
likely that congressional intent along with the plain language of the
statute will lead the court to declare that knowledge or reckless disregard
is sufficient to establish a violation and conviction under United States
immigration law.
c. Statutory Revision May Provide Resolution to the Circuit Split
If the Supreme Court does not resolve the circuit split, there are a
few other possible
remedies that Congress can implement. One approach is to revise
the language of the statute to include definitions of the different terms
that have proven to be confusing to the different federal courts, mirroring
the structure of the United Kingdom statutes in its Immigration Act of
1971. Terms included in statutes may not be intended to be interpreted
through the word’s common usage, and such a statute might include
definitions for the terms that have been points of confusion for courts.
An example of this would be a clear definition of what the word “bring”
means in the context of a § 1324(a)(2) smuggling offense.
Another potential revision to § 1324(a)(2) would be to add a list of
aggravating and mitigating factors in the sentencing language. This
would not change the meaning of the statute, but would make clear that
the different levels of mens rea would be punished differently. In
amending the statute to include these additional factors, Congress should
171

See generally 132 CONG. REC. S16879-01 (Daily Ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (providing
various senators’ opinions on immigration concerns and the proposed immigration
legislation reform); see also 132 CONG. REC. S16374-04 (Daily Ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
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look to models such as the Model Penal Code for an understanding of the
types of factors that may properly be considered aggravating or
mitigating.177 In the case of capital punishment for murder, aggravating
and mitigating circumstances are taken into consideration for
sentencing.178 Aggravating circumstances include prior convictions for
murder, committing another murder at the same time, and the murder
having been committed for financial gain.179 Mitigating circumstances
include having no significant criminal record, committing the murder
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or the
defendant being a youth at the time of the crime.180
An approach that draws from the Model Penal Code may be
optimal for equitable concerns.181 Further, an approach that draws from
the Model Penal Code’s example would allow for increased judicial
guidance, predictability, and a reduction in the “disparity in application
and the potential abuse of discretion,”182 issues that the current statute
and circuit split are prone to. Furthermore, adopting a more clear system
of graded punishment based on increasing levels of mental intent is
another nuance from the Model Penal Code183 that could be used to
refine the current statute, providing punishment that differs not only
based upon whether the act was done for commercial gain, but also
whether it was done knowingly, in reckless disregard, or if the mental
state of the actor does not rise to the level of either. The Model Penal
Code is structured based on principles of criminal law and punishment,
which may cause criticism if § 1324 (a)(2) were revised to adopt a
similar structure and principle. While immigration law offenses are of a
different severity and nature than capital offenses, the principle of using
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to inform sentencing can help
provide a punishment that takes into account all relevant circumstances
and reflects culpability more accurately. As previously noted, recent
revisions of immigration law have leaned toward an increased degree of

177
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) & (4) (1980) (providing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which will impact determination of culpability and sentencing).
178
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (2) (1980).
179
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (3) (1980).
180
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (4) (1980).
181
Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal
Code, https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf, PAGE (1999)
(“Structurally, the Model Penal Code asks three questions: 1) is the actor’s conduct a
crime? 2) if it is a crime, was it wrongful under these facts? 3) if it was wrongful, is the
actor blameworthy? These questions acknowledge that a crime can be done by an actor
who is not blameworthy.”).
182
Id. at 334.
183
Id. at 334–35.

Spring 2014]

Settling the Law For Eduin Rodriguez

433

criminalization,184 and a Model Penal Code-inspired approach may not
only be informative but would be appropriate in addressing the criminal
elements of immigration smuggling offenses.
d. A New Approach: the Point System
Another approach to immigration crimes and penalties that has not
yet been commonly used in the past, if ever, is a point-system to balance
the various factors that can inform the culpability and punishable nature
of an immigration offense. A point system reflects aggravating and
mitigating factors through a point value, and the aggregate of the points
accumulated determine the level of punishment that is applied. A point
system would take in to account that bringing an alien into the United
States without authorization is against the letter of the law, but also
reflect that in some circumstances entry is facilitated for reasons that
may not necessarily violate the spirit of the law by assigning to each
factor a positive or negative amount of points.
The language of the proposed statute would be similar to that of
§ 1324 (a)(2). The point-based statute would provide that:
“A person is guilty of assisting illegal entry into the United States
if they bring a person who has not had prior authorization into the
country to any place within the United States.”
A. Point Values185
—(0) points assigned for actually committing the act;
—(1) point for committing the act in reckless
the alien did not have
disregard186 of the fact that
prior authorization to enter the United States;
—(2) points for committing the act knowing187 that
the alien did not have prior authorization to enter the
United States;

184

Legomsky, supra note 136, at 471–72.
The proposed use of a point system, in the context of immigration policy and
enforcement, is an original idea, guided by the relevant immigration case law and policy
concerns. Point systems have been used in other contexts, for example, in Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
186
See United States v Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 781 (11th Cir. 2006). The point system is
implemented using the same interpretation of “reckless disregard” as courts have
previously used regarding § 1324 (a)(2).
185
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—(2) points if the act was done for commercial
gain188;
—(2) points if the act was done with the intention to
pursue commercial +gain once entry was achieved189;
—up to (3) points if violence190 was involved in the
commission of the act;
—(2) points if illegal substances were involved;
—and an additional (1) point is assigned if this is in
furtherance of a larger or more substantial operation;
—(-.50) points if the person is a child191;
—(-.50) points if the person qualifies for asylum
status or intends to apply;
—(-.25) points if the person is presented to
immigration officials directly;
—(-.25) points assigned if the person is a family
member.
B. Based on the points accrued: the penalties can be a fine and/or
probation (up to (1) point), a fine and/or 6 months imprisonment

187
See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998). The point system is
implemented using the same interpretation of “knowing/knowingly” that the Supreme
Court has previously defined.
188
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (including an increased punishment for a
violation perpetrated for commercial advantage or private financial gain).
189
Id.
190
This was selected as an aggravating factor because there are numerous cases in
which bringing aliens into the country illegally results in violence and even death. See
generally Jacqueline Armendariz, Agencies tell of immigrant deaths, rescues, VALLEY
MORNING
STAR
(December
25,
2012,
6:30
PM),
http://www.valleymorningstar.com/news/article_27f7991c-4ef3-11e2-9e7a0019bb30f31a.html; see also John MacCormack, Immigrant deaths soar in South Texas,
MY SAN ANTIONIO (December 30, 2012). http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_new
s/article/Border-woes-no-longer-just-on-the-border-4155003.php.
191
These factors were developed based on general principles of immigration law. See
generally the INA, which includes provisions for asylum and refugee seekers, those who
enter the country illegally but present themselves to officials immediately, and policies
such as withholding of removal which reflect the consideration of children and the family
unit.
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(1-1.5 points), and prison sentences increase as the points
increase with a maximum of 10 years imprisonment.

In its application, a statute applied through a point system can
increase the efficiency of courts in making decisions, and also narrow the
scope of potential factors to look at during an appeal. A point system,
however, might seem arbitrary, as the value of certain factors, such as
whether the alien was a family member, can play a larger role in different
circumstances. For example, if that family member was a person’s
young daughter and was subject to female genital mutilation in her native
country,192 some might question whether the points allotted to the family
member should be the same as the point value for a person who
smuggles a distant cousin into the United States as a part of a drug
operation. However, the point value assigned to all of the other factors
considered will reflect the wide range of persons and motives. While it
may seem inequitable that both of these offenders receive the same
amount of points for such divergent family connections, each offender
would also receive positive or negative points for other factors—such as
if they performed the act in connection with another crime or for
financial gain—and as such concerns of equity are minimalized.
An increase in prosecutorial discretion, particularly in cases that
involve children, family members, and asylum-seekers, among others,
can help to remedy the potential damage that the arbitrary enforcement
of immigration laws can have on aliens and families.193 In immigration
cases that involve the illegal entry of children, some courts have allowed
the best interests of the child to inform their decisions, particularly in the
case of asylum-seekers.194 But increased prosecutorial discretion can
lead to abuses of this discretion in cases that are particularly sympathetic
or relatable. Using a point system helps to standardize the process but
take into consideration the family and children involved.
A variety of individuals commit immigration offenses for a wide
range of reasons. In a large, complicated system, concerns of efficiency
are at the forefront of factors that must inform the decision to implement
a law or system to control immigration. Even the combination of
192

See generally Meredith Aherne, Olowo v. Ashcroft: Granting Parental Asylum
Based on a Child’s Refugee Status, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 317 (2006) (discussing female
genital mutilation (“FGM”), and the need for a more workable immigration policy,
specifically asylum law, that promotes family unity and recognizes FGM as a worldwide
problem).
193
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 CONN.PUB. INT. L. J. 243, 245–46 (2010).
194
Mary-Hunter Morris, Babies and Bathwater: Seeking an Appropriate Standard of
Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child Soldiers, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
281, 296 (2008).
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consideration of the totality of circumstances, prosecutorial discretion,
and individual consideration on a case-by-basis will not guarantee a
balanced outcome in every case. But by implementing a point-system,
there is room for both subjective and objective analysis, and an
opportunity for the justice system to provide each person with both
efficiency and fairness in the consideration of their offenses.
IV. CONCLUSION
A significant problem with the current state of § 1324 (a)(2) is the
fact that the federal circuit courts are split on the mental intent necessary
to violate the statute. This disagreement means that two persons
committing identical offenses would be subject to entirely different
outcomes under the same federal law simply based on what part of the
United States they assisted an illegal entry into.195 In the Eleventh
Circuit, this means that two people who helped an unauthorized alien
enter the country are subject to criminal penalties regardless of the
reasons behind their actions.
The criminalization of immigration offenses has become an
emerging trend in the United States.196 Within the last twenty years,
there has been a growing anti-immigrant197 and anti-immigration
sentiment emerging in American society, which has in turn informed the
development of immigration laws and policies.198 Although stricter
immigration policies may be necessary to manage the logistics of
increasing immigration into the United States, it is important that
Congress and the courts implement and foster policies that punish only
those who are culpable, and not those who innocently or unknowingly
violate the law. Furthermore, it is significant that there is a degree of
predictability to immigration laws so that individuals are put on notice of
the law and whether actions they may engage in could result in
compromising their freedom through criminal punishment.
Consider again the case of Eduin Rordriguez. Abandoned by his
parents at a young age, Eduin traveled through several countries in

195

Sabbag, supra note 16, at 501–02.
Legomsky, supra note 136, at 475.
197
See generally Roque Planas, Jose Antonio Vargas Restarts ‘Illegal’ v.
‘Undocumented” Debates, Highlighting Role of Latino Media, HUFFINGTON POST , Sept.
27, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/jose-antonio-vargas-ill
egal-undocumented_n_1918631.html; see also Ilona Bray, supra note 115 (speaking to
the general anti-immigrant sentiment that has been clearly expressed in the media).
198
Dawn Marie Johnson, Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration
Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 479–80 (2001).
196
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dangerous conditions to arrive in the United States.199 Presumably, a
child such as Eduin must have received help from well-meaning people
along the way. Under the language of § 1324(a)(2), the people who
helped Eduin travel safely and cross the border would be subjecting
themselves to criminal punishment under § 1324(a)(2) in the Eleventh
Circuit by doing so. Eduin is not the first innocent person in need of help
to reach safety in the United States, and he will not be the last. Allowing
for some flexibility and predictability in the enforcement of §1342(a)(2)
is one way to be sure that those who helped Eduin find his way out of
danger are not punished unreasonably, and those who encounter
vulnerable, hurt people in need of assistance in the future do not feel as
though they have no choice but to turn a blind eye.
The current circuit split regarding § 1324(a)(2) presents both
Congress and the Supreme Court with a unique opportunity to remedy an
issue regarding a very specific subsection of a large body of law, and at
the same time speak to the larger issue of immigration control and reform
in the United States. Addressing this circuit split is an opportunity for
the government to remedy some of the existing tension and confusion
regarding immigration law, preventing the unnecessary and unwarranted
encroachment on the liberty of those individuals who may commit
immigration violations innocently and perhaps even accidentally. By
clarifying this one aspect of immigration law and policy, we have an
opportunity to help control future unauthorized entry, encourage
immigration through the proper channels, acknowledge that immigration
and the concerns surrounding it are both complex and constantly
evolving, and require policies and laws that can improve and evolve with
it.

199
Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES,
August 25, 2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegalimmigrants-face-deportation.hmtl?pagewanted.

